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ABSTARCT 
 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSNs) is a network of sensors deployed in places 
unsuitable for human beings and where constant monitoring is required. They work 
with low power, low cost smart devices having limited computing resources. They 
have a crucial role to play in battle surveillance, border control and infrastructure 
protection. Keeping in view the precious data they transmit, their security from active 
or passive attacks is very crucial. We came to know about LOCK model implementing 
novel Distributed Key Management Exclusion Basis (EBS) System is very efficient in 
providing with Network Security. Keeping in view the importance of Data Security 
we preferred to secure WSN data through Public Key Encryption methods like RSA. 
We also discussed and implemented Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and its 
advantages over RSA.  
 
However our novel Spiral Encryption Technique implemented along with ECC 
algorithm, has shown how it helped in making the transmitted message more secure 
and less informative for the eavesdropper. 
 
Key words:  Wireless Sensor Network, Exclusion Basis System, LOCK, encryption, 
authentication, Public Key Encryption, RSA, Elliptic Curves, Galois Field, Modular 
Arithmetic  
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C h a p t e r  1 
1. Introduction 
A cooperative network, collection of systematized nodes is known as wireless sensor 
network. Spatially distributed autonomous sensors are the main tool for the WSN which are 
used radically in the field of physical/environmental conditions monitoring i.e; pressure, 
temperature, sound etc. as well as to pass their data cooperatively to a main location by using 
the network. Each single node has its own processing capability (like a 
microcontrollers/CPUs/DSP chips), consists of multiple types of memory (e.g., 
program/data/flash), have a RF transceiver, a power source (e.g., batteries/solar cells). As 
we’re living in the 20th century, WSNs are on the verge of an accelerated mass scale 
deployment pace. That day is not far when everyone can access a wireless sensor network 
through internet worldwide. This can make Internet a giant corporeal network. With 
unlimited scope of abundant application, areas like environmental (e.g., earthquake 
monitoring, ocean & wildlife monitoring), medical, entertainment, military, smart spaces, 
crisis management, homeland defense, and transportation this new technology offers a new 
dimension to our evolving technologies. An even broader range of upcoming applications is 
expected to breakthrough in the areas of supervision of pollution, forest fires, potable water 
quality, and even human heart rates too. 
 
Owing to the fact that a wireless sensor network is a real-time system, new solutions 
are need of the hour to suffice the fact that very little prior work can be implemented in the 
system. The prime reason is actually the set of initial conditions needed for implementing 
previous work has changed drastically. Lately in the previous studies it’s been assumed that 
most scattered systems are wired with unlimited power source hence are not real-time. 
However the WSNs systems are real-time and wireless therefore there is limited power. They 
have dynamically changing sets of resources by making use of sensors & actuators as 
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interfaces. Utilization of resource constraint devices which places a strain for the effective 
training/ machine learning. 
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C h a p t e r  2 
Security, Threat and Attacks 
 
2.1 Security 
 
 The security services in Wireless Sensor Networks aims to protect the information and 
resources from all kinds of attacks and misbehaviour. And it requires: 
 
a) Authorization: It ensures the information is provided only by the nodes which are 
authorized to the network services. 
 
b) Secrecy: It ensures that the delivered message is only understood by its recipient, 
not by anyone else. 
 
c) Availability: It ensures that the availability of the desired network even in 
presence of denial of service attacks. 
 
d) Authentication: It ensures the genuinity of the communication from one node to 
another, ensuring that a malicious node cannot camouflage itself as a trusted node. 
 
e) Integrity: Integrity is ensured by not letting the message modified by any 
malicious node while sending it from one node to another. 
 
f) Non-repudiation: It ensures that the denial of sending previously sent message is 
not possible for a node. 
 
g) Robustness: It denotes that the whole network is not compromised when few are 
under attack. 
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2.2 Threats 
 
Following categories are the classification of threats in Wireless Sensor Network (by Karlof 
et. al. [2]): 
 
a) Bit-class vs. High end processor-class attacks: In bit-class attacks, WSN is 
confronted by the intruder by using a few nodes with similar capabilities as that of 
network nodes. In High end processor-class attacks, considerably more damage is 
possible by an intruder by the use of high end processors, etc. to a network than a 
mischievous sensor node. 
b) Stranger vs. insider attacks: A stranger enemy has no admittance to most 
cryptographic resources in sensor network. Stranger attacks occurs by the nodes 
which are not a part of WSN. The insider attacks arise to the legitimate nodes of a 
WSN and then they behave in inadvertent or illicit ways. 
c) Passive vs. active attacks: Spying/observing of packets switched within a WSN is 
Passive in nature; the active attacks encompass some adjustments of the data flow 
or the making of a false inlet in a WSN. 
 
 
2.3 Attacks 
 
Invasive & Non-invasive are the two categories of attacks in wireless sensor networks. Side 
channel attacks (i.e.; power/timing/frequency) are caused due to Non-invasive attacks. On the 
other hand Invasive outbreaks are plentiful more common and the more significant of these 
are described in the subsequent sections. 
Numerous outbreaks on sensor networks are enumerated as follows: 
 
A) Node Duplication Attack: 
 In node duplication attack an enemy inserts a different node into a network 
which has been replicated after a present node. This replicated node can behave 
exactly like the old node or it can have some extra behaviour, such as conveying data 
of interest straight to the invader. 
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B) Routing attack 
 Discerning forwarding: In discerning forwarding it impacts the net traffic by 
making the sensor network believe that all the contributing nodes in net are 
dependable to frontward the message. 
 Sinkhole attacks: In sinkhole attacks, enemy draws the traffic to a 
apprehended hub. Modest way of forming sinkhole is to place a spy hub where 
it can draw most of the traffic, perhaps nearer to the base station or spy node 
itself deceiving as a base station. 
 Sybil attacks: In Sybil attack, multiple identities are presented by a single node 
to all other nodes in the WSN by which the other nodes may mislead. The 
efficacy of fault lenient structures are reduced by this attack. Topographical 
routing is additional malevolent factor is that a Sybil node can appear at more 
than one place concurrently. 
 Wormholes: In wormhole attacks, an attacker tunnels messages over a low 
latency link by positioning an enemy nearer to base station and fully disrupts 
the traffic. It convinces the nodes that they are nearer to the base station which 
are truly multi hop away. Which constructs a sinkhole because enemy on the 
further side of the sinkhole offers a superior path to the base station. 
 Flooding: Earlier, the malicious node can root a colossal traffic of 
unserviceable mails on the network. This is acknowledged as the flooding. 
 
C) Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack: 
 Here the target machine is rendered and inaccessible by the legitimate users 
caused by the hacker. It’s divided into two parts. 
 Active attack: Malevolent nodes injure other nodes by initiating network 
outage by segregating while saving battery life is not a priority. 
 Passive attack: Here selfish nodes practise the network but do not collaborate. 
They save battery lifespan in lieu of their own transport network, they don’t 
aim to damage other nodes directly. They are like parasites. 
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D) Information in Transit Attack 
  Data transition period is prone to eavesdropping, modification, injection. By 
entrenched verification, reliability, confidentiality & repeat protocols these can be prevented. 
Tightly targeted attacks can be occurred by the attacker by mapping the routing layout of a 
network, enabling disruption into the chosen portions of a network for maximum damage.  
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C h a p t e r  3 
NETWORK SECURITY 
 
 The data is communicated, to forwarding nodes (or gateways), using wireless links. After 
further processing the data it communicates with the outer world over the base stations also 
known as command nodes. Access points to the network are provided by these Base Stations. 
Here user requests are initiated and network replies are acknowledged. Normally, gateways 
and base stations are high-end node. But it should be known that same or different node can 
perform the work of gateway and base station. 
 
3.1 KEY MANAGEMENT 
 
A key may be a symmetric bivariate polynomial or 128 bit string. Multitude of keys are 
needed to be coped for encryption and authentication of sensitive data exchanged. For 
authentication and encryption a multitude of keys might have to be coped then. The goal of 
key managing is to form protected communication among collaborative parties. 
 
  
 For secure and efficient redistribution and for secure channel communication keys 
generation, administrative keys are used. For securing direct/indirect communication between 
two nodes Communication keys are used and to maintain privacy and flexibility to attacks, or 
catastrophes. Network keys (both administrative and communication keys) are changed (re-
keyed).  Eschenauer and Gligor [3] introduced all contemporary seminal random key 
predistribution scheme. In order to enhance widespread applicability and robustness of the 
network the future of that scheme is motivated by the use of deployment knowledge [4] and 
key polynomials [5] known by the name of Static Key Managing. 
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Another outline based on distinctiveness based symmetric keying is proposed by Jolly et al. 
[6]. Dynamic  schemes  help to  reach flexibility  to  attack  in  long-lasting  networks  and  
especially  highlight  group  communication  keys. Dynamic key management is preferred as 
a security scheme because of longevity of the network & rekeying facility, meant for the 
WSN’s. 
 
3.2 KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME IN SENSOR NETWORK 
 
3.2.1 Static Key Management 
 
As the name suggests  as soon as  administrative keys  are  pre-deployed  into the  hubs,  they  
will  not  be  altered. They are assigned to hubs whichever arbitrarily or based on some prior 
deployment information.  The concept of overlapping of administrative keys is used by Most 
static schemes to govern the suitability of neighbouring hubs to create a straight pair-wise 
communication key. 
 
Figure 3.1: Key distribution to a node--k keys-- out of P=k+m pool of keys 
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3.2.2 Dynamic Key Management 
 
Dynamic key management schemes periodically modifies administrative keys, on request or 
hub apprehension.  The enhanced network survivability is the major benefit of dynamic 
keying.  In Static keying the likelihood of network apprehension upsurges upon adding new 
hubs which is solved by the use of exclusion-based systems (EBSs). 
 
3.3 SENSOR NETWORK MODEL 
 
A clusters of sensors is formed on the basis of their capabilities & communication range. And 
it’s organised by a cluster group head or gateway. It broadcasts messages to all cluster 
sensors. Because of the stationary nature of sensor & gateway hubs; their deployed position 
and message array of all hubs in the network are recognised. Each gateway can reach to all 
the other cluster sensors either directly or in multi-hop. Sensors perform by relaying & 
sensing. In case of further than single hop away from the gateway, hubs send their data 
through relaying; on the other hand sensing is accountable for piercing their surroundings to 
follow a target/ event & then relayed to the gateway. This model’s architecture is illustrated 
in Fig. 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Clustered Sensor Network 
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3.4 COLLUSON PROBLEM 
 
The security outline offered in [8] is founded on the EBS to discourse the collusion problem 
that implements position centred key consignment. The number of keys revealed via 
capturing collocated hubs can be minimized by this. In  [8]  the offered network prototype  is  
alike  to  this  model  established  by clusters  and  gateways.  EBS structure is used to 
execute rekeying inside each cluster.  Here gateways circulate keys to the hubs. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 EXCLUSION BASIS SYSTEM (EBS) 
 
EBS comprised of a combinatorial construction of the group key managing issue. Here each 
node is allocated k keys out of  a  pool  of  size  P( P =  k  +  m)  keys.  When nodes get 
captured, rekeying takes place but even when it’s not captured then also it takes place 
periodically. Auxiliary keys are created &  encoded  via  all  the  ‘m’  keys which are 
anonymous  to  the  apprehended nodes,  and  lastly  circulated  to  further  nodes  that  
mutually know the m keys. Small number of nodes may collude and all the network keys can 
collectively be revealed which is a drawback of the basic EBS. This happens when the m 
value is selected to be relatively small. It is conceivable that few compromised nodes can 
collude and reveal all the keys active in the network to an enemy.  In that case that enemy 
will be able to reveal entirely encoded communications in the system.  SHELL [6] utilizes the 
physical propinquity of nodes so that a hub would part maximum keys with nearby hubs.  To 
elude the consignment of matching key combinations, key swap of is engaged. 
Hence, it can be perceived that if numerous nodes conspire, it is probable to disclose all 
active keys. In demand of discoursing the collusion problem in [8], a proficient dynamic key 
management scheme has been offered by researchers. 
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3.6 LOCALIZED COMBINATORIAL KEYING (LOCK) 
 
For the clustered sensor networks LOCK is an EBS-based dynamic key management scheme. 
The corporal network prototype shown as a three-tier WSN followed by cluster leader nodes 
(CLs) with the base station (BS) at the top & then consistent sensor nodes. In this scheme 
pre-deployment information cannot be presumed about the estimated positions of all the 
nodes. LOCK uses EBS administrative keys consisted of two layers. The upper layer is EBSb 
which empowers the base station for managing the cluster leaders as a set. The lower layer 
(level 0) comprises an EBSCi (Each cluster Ci). A cluster leader, Ci, is a member in both the 
upper EBSb as well as the lower EBSCi.  
The EBSb administrative keys are used to produce (and refresh) group session keys used by 
the BS to converse with the CLs. whereas the administrative keys of every EBSCi are used to 
refresh & create) cluster session keys. As CL is being considered a regular member in its 
EBS; knows only those cluster administrative keys which the other node knows in the similar 
cluster. 
Figure 3.3: LOCK Model Overview 
Accordingly, it’s been assumed that if CL is captured, it will not provide any additional 
cluster keys than the captured ones to the attacker. 
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A backup key set (common with the base station and anonymous to their (or any further) 
cluster leader) is established by the sensor nodes of each cluster during the initialization 
phase. Key generation of EBSC keys is accomplished by a set of sensor nodes inside the 
cluster entitled as key generation nodes (KGNs), CL usually selects those. Key distribution is 
performed by the CL. 
 
The likelihood of sharing a key polynomial between any two arbitrarily chosen nodes, Ps, is 
defined as follows: 
 
                                            
 
Where k is the number of polynomials known to a node and m is the number of polynomials 
unknown to that node. 
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C h a p t e r  4 
DATA ENCRYPTION 
 The alteration of data into a form which is practically meaningless and cannot be figured out     
without the use of some key. This transformed data is known as cipher text. Decryption is its 
reverse process i.e.; retrieval of original data (secret message) by use of another key. 
Encryption standard applications include secure storage of secrets in the keychain and in the 
creation of certificates and digital signatures 
In Wireless Sensor Network; data security can be provided in two ways. One is Hardware 
based encryption and another is Software based encryption. But if we try to compare these 
two it happens that the security provided in the Wireless Sensor Network by only software 
based encryption is increased by few percent while combining both software and hardware 
encryption. And moreover in hardware encryption the transmitted data packets remains the 
same size. In this chapter we will describe the Software based encryption system. 
 
4.1 SOFTWARE BASED ENCRYPTION SYSTEM 
 
In WSN the data which is transmitted through a wireless channel can be easily fetched by an 
intruder. Basically in software based encryption system what happens that it encrypts the 
message by using keys which is only known to the receiver and then sends it over the 
wireless medium. But recently few new techniques evolved in which while encrypting the 
data, two sets of keys are used. One is Public Key and another is Private Key. This encryption 
system is called Public Encryption System. 
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4.1.1 Public Key Encryption System (PKE 
 Encryption used in wireless security, is broadly classified into  symmetric key 
encryption and asymmetric key encryption. PKE is a perfect example of asymmetric encryption [9]. 
 
In asymmetric key cryptography, for encrypting and decrypting a message different set of 
keys are used. In this one key is made public while the other is kept private. This arrangement 
is basically known as Public Key Cryptography. Main advantages over symmetric encryption 
are: The need for generating  and assigning n number of secret keys for n people is eliminated 
and both authentication as well as cryptography can be implemented using this algorithm. 
 
The first public key algorithm that went viral is known as RSA encryption. It is still the most 
popular method of encryption that is based on mathematical manipulation of two large prime 
numbers and their product. Its strength is supposed to be associated with the difficulty of 
factoring a very large prime number. The assortment of long-enough prime numbers by the 
recent, predictable speed of current digital computers for the generation of the RSA keys has 
the potential to make this algorithm secure indefinitely. However, there is no mathematical 
proof of this belief i.e.; breaking RSA encryption might be possible by a computationally fast 
factorization algorithm. With the current advancements and researches in the field of 
quantum computers factoring a large prime number will be a trivial issue. 
 
Based on a different mathematical model, other public key algorithms equivalent to RSA in 
terms of complexity is Elliptic Curve Encryption. It is similar in use to RSA encryption 
method (though they have altogether a different mathematics behind), and will be discussed 
elaborately ahead. 
 
Let us take an example to see how a public key algorithms (here it is RSA) handles the 
problem of key distribution, assuming that Maria wants to avail a safe and secure 
communication from Bob. This technique is demonstrated below in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Implementation of asymmetric key encryption 
 
 
The protected message exchange demonstrated in Figure 4.1 is described here: 
 
1. Maria using public key algorithm generates two encryption key; a reserved key, 
which she has to keep undisclosed, and a public key. Meanwhile Maria has a message 
for John. 
2. Now Maria sends her public key to John. As estimating private key from public key is 
next to impossible, sending public key won’t compromise her private key.  
3. Maria now proves her uniqueness to John (a process known as authentication).  Only 
thing she has to do is to encrypt entire or a part of the message using her private key 
and transmit to John.  
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4. Now John decrypts the message with Maria’s public key. As the message was 
encrypted by private key of Maria, it must be decrypted back to the original message 
only with the use her Public key which proves her authenticity. 
5. John encrypts his message using Maria’s public key and sends it to Maria.  Since only 
Maria has the private key to decrypt the message, it remains hidden to eavesdropping. 
6. Maria decrypts the message with her private key. 
Issues concerning national security as well as protection of Intellectual properties of 
corporates, heavily rely on data encryption and authentication. For this a crew of extremely 
smart people are assigned the task of creating, testing and breaking secure systems exploring  
and fixing each and every possibility of loopholes.  From this it is very easy to conclude the 
huge complexity of actual real time secure communication and authentication 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Eavesdropping 
 Encrypting the message with the private key for authentication  can be meddled by a man-
in-the-middle attack, in which someone (Eve) with mischievous intent ( Figure 4.2 )  
replaces intercepted Maria’s original message with her own, so as to mislead John to use 
Eve’s public key. Eve then re-encrypts each of Maria’s messages after decrypting it with 
Maria’s public key by altering it with her own private key and. Then John decrypts it with 
Eve’s public key under the perception that that the keys came from Maria. 
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C h a p t e r  5 
ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
It was proposed by Victor Miller [10]   and Neal Koblitz [11] individually in 1985. ECC 
provided an efficient alternative to other public-key encryption algorithms, such as RSA. 
Public key based all ECC schemes, implement the discreet log problem for elliptic curves 
which are quite difficult to solve. Presently, many standardizing bodies such as ANSI, IEEE 
[12], ISO and NIST [13] have adopted ECC and accepted commercially. Now it has been a 
trend that conventional public key cryptographic systems are gradually being replaced with 
ECC systems. With evolving computational power, the key size of the conventional systems 
also has to show similar dramatic increase. 
 
Elliptic curves have been studied by mathematicians for over a hundred years. They have 
been deployed in diverse areas. 
 
Number theory: Proves Fermat`s Last Theorem in 1995 [16]. The equation has no nonzero 
integer solutions for    when the integer n is greater than 2. 
Modern physics: String theory: The notion of a point-like particle is replaced by a curve-like 
string. 
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography: An efficient public key cryptographic system. 
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5.1 Necessity and Advantages 
 
For an equivalent amount of security ECC systems is at par with RSA. It leads to less 
important operations, lesser transistors for hardware implementation and ,less time 
consuming Encryption. For example:  155-bit ECC uses 11,000 transistors while a 512-bit 
RSA implementation uses 50,000[14]. 
 
Although same level of security, data sizes, encrypted message sizes and computational 
power are present in both ECC and RSA, former has smaller keys (Table 5.1 and Fig 5.1) and 
less bandwidth requirements than the other cryptographic algorithms (RSA). 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Public key sizes for AES followed by the guidelines of NIST [15] 
 
RSA vs. ECC 
 
Figure 5.1: From [15] 
 
ECC KEY SIZE 
(Bits) 
RSA KEY SIZE 
(Bits) 
KEY SIZE 
RATIO 
AES KEY SIZE 
(Bits) 
163 1024 1:6  
256 3072 1:12 128 
384 7680 1:20 192 
512 15360 1:30 256 
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5.2 MODULAR ARITHMATIC 
 
Simple operations in Modular Arithmetic  
5 + 7 mod 5 = 12 mod 5 = 7 mod 5 
 
To first reduce the operands moduli operator can be applied individually.. 
7 +1 8 mod 6 = 1 + 0 mod 6 = 25 mod 6 
 
 Multiplication operation can also be performed like this 
3 * 5 mod 13 = 15 mod 13 = 28 mod 13 
 
 
5.3 ELLIPTIC CURVE GROUPS OVER REAL NUMBERS 
 
Over real numbers an elliptic curve is  set of points (x, y) that satisfy an elliptic curve 
equation of the form:  
y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b, where x, y, a and b are real numbers. 
Each choice of the numbers a and b yields a different elliptic curve. For example, a = -4 and b 
= 0.67 gives the elliptic curve with equation y
2
 = x
3
 - 4x + 0.67; the graph of this curve is 
shown below: (Fig 5.2) Remember that an Elliptic curve is not an Ellipse.  
 Elliptic curve y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b can be used to form a group if it does not have any repeated 
roots. In other words 4a
3
 + 27b
2 
  should not be zero.  An elliptic curve group over real 
numbers consists of the points present in itself as well as a special point O called the point at 
infinity. 
 
Wireless Sensor Data Security |  
 
28 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  y
2
 = x
3
 - 4x + 0.67 
 
The curves are defined in their standard Weierstrass form E: y
2
 =x
3
 +ax + b and are deﬁned 
over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp, where p > 3 and is prime and a, b ∈ Fp.  A large prime-order subgroup 
of the group E(Fp) of Fp-rational points on the curve E is employed in the protocol. All 
solutions (x, y) ∈ (Fp )
2 
to the curve equation  along  with a point at inﬁnity, the neutral 
element is contained in this group of rational points . The
 
number of Fp-rational points is 
being denoted by #E(Fp) and the prime order of the subgroup by
 n. A ﬁxed generator of the 
cyclic subgroup that may be selected at random is called as base point and denoted by
 
G ∈ 
E(Fp). 
 
5.4 BASIC MATHEMATICS REVIEW 
 
Field: A collection of numbers on which addition and multiplication are defined, and follow 
these rules [17]  is known as a field : 
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Additive Commutativity:  C + D = D + C 
Multiplicative Commutativity:  C* D = D * C 
Additive Associativity:  C + (E + D) = (C + E) + D 
Multiplicative Associativity:  C * (E * D) = (C * E) * D 
Distributive:  C* (E + D) = (C * E) + (C * D) 
Additive Identity:  C + 0 = C 
Multiplicative Identity:  C * 1 = C 
Additive Negation:  C– C = 0 
Multiplicative Inversion:  C / C = 1 ( C has to be nonzero) 
 
Galois Field: Galois fields exist only of size p
n
, for a prime no. p and natural no. n 
 When n is equal to 1 (i.e. a field of size that of prime number ), (Fig 5.4) and  modular 
arithmetic over p 
 When n greater than 1  (Fig 5.3) modular arithmetic not possible.[18] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: GF for n>1 
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Figure 5.4: GF for n=1 
 
Group: A group (H, +) consists of a set of numbers H as well as an  operation + which 
satisﬁes the below mentioned properties.[19] 
 Identity: for an element 0 ∈ H such that A+0 =0 + A for all A ∈ H. 
 Associativity :(A+B)+C = A+(B+C) for all A,B,C ∈H. 
 Inverse: for each A ∈ H, there will exists an element −A ∈ H such that 
 (−A) + A = A + (−A) = 0 ∈ H 
 
A ﬁeld (M , +, ×) is a set of numbers F together with two operations and that satisﬁes the 
following properties. 
 ( M , +) is an abelian group with identity 0. 
 (×) is associative. 
  There exists an identity 1 ∈ M with 1 6= 0 such that 1 × D = D × 1 = D for 
all D ∈ M. 
  The operation × is distributive over +, i.e., A × (B + C) = (A × B) + (A × 
C) and (B + C) × A = (B × A) + (C × A) for all A, B, C ∈ M. 
 A × B = B × A for all A,B ∈ M 
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 For every A 6= 0, A ∈ M there exists an element A-1 ∈ M such that A-1 × A 
= A × A
-1
 = 1. 
 
 A finite (or Galois) ﬁeld has a ﬁnite set of elements. In the ﬁeld F2 can numbers be 
represented by {0, 1} and numbers in F2n  can be represented as n-bit binary numbers.  
 
 
5.4.1 Point Addition Operation in Elliptic Curve 
 
Let Z be the points on an elliptic curve. Let it be defined over the field F2, with the addition 
of the point OE  
 Lines at infinity will intersect Z at OE thrice. 
 Vertical lines will intersect Z twice, and at OE  
 All lines in F 2 intersect Z in three places. 
. Addition occurs as follows [l8].  Let C, D be in Z. 
 First,  make sure a line is drawn between C and D. 
 Where C and D intersect Z for the third time, draw another vertical line. 
 C +D is the point where the above vertical line will intersects Z a second 
time 
 
.                                                     
5.4.2 Curve Addition in Elliptic Curve 
 
Consider two points P(-2.35,-1.86) and Q(-0.1,0.83)   on the  Elliptic Curve as shown below. 
(Fig 5.5) Any straight line through these points will surely pass through the third point on the 
curve -R(3.89,5.62). 
Take the reflection of the point about y axis to get the resultant point R(3.89,-5.62). This 
operation is called Point Addition. 
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Figure 5.5: Point Addition 
 
When P and Q converges to a single point we get a tangent to the curve and after taking 
reflection of the intersected point along y axis we get the final point. This operation is Point 
Doubling as shown below (Fig 5.6). 
 
Arithmetic for this is given as follows   
          
 
Figure 5.6: Point Doubling 
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 For addition the generic algorithm [20] is: 
 
Given E : y
2   
=x
3
 + ax +b,  P1=(x1,y1), P2=(x2,y2), both on E 
 
 
 
         Where  
 
           And  
 
 
Scalar Multiplication is defined as a process of recursive additions. 
 Given an Elliptic Curve Z,  a point M in Z, and scalar t. 
 tM = M + M + M + … t times. 
Simplified steps for the above operation is:  
 Double 
 Add P 
This scalar multiplication is the strength of ECC. As shown above, while computing tM 
means we have to add point M exactly t− 1 times to itself.  This would result in another point 
Q on the elliptic curve. The reverse process / the inverse operation, of recovering k when the 
points P and Q = tM are given, is known as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
(ECDLP) which is practically very difficult for the unauthenticated intruder.  
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5.5 Implementation of Menezes-Vanstone Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem  
 
Maria has a message M to be sent to John which is split into chunks (m1,m2). Following is a 
convention which both follow: --- 
 p1 – Any prime number greater than 3 preferably large 
 FP – A Galois field of size p 
 E1 – y2   =x3 + ax +b (a, b in Fp) ---- an elliptic curve in field F 
 P1 – Base Point( A randomly selected point on E)  to generate subgroup H1 
 H1 – A subgroup of E1  of the same size as of E1 
 
Public Key: John's pubic key.  Actually it is circulated to the whole  world. 
 ß: John's public key is computed as ß = aP1.  It is a point in H1. 
Secret: Maria also has a secret not to be shared with any one. 
 k: An  arbitrarily selected number by Maria which varies each time a message is sent.   
 Private Key: John's private key. It is secure with him. Nobody else does know it. 
 a: John's private key is a arbitrarily selected natural number. 
 Encryption: Maria has a secret m. Before encryption she separates it into m1 and m2 
(message splitting) 
 Maria computes (y1, y2) = kß 
 Maria computes c0= kP1  ← Note that c0 is a point. 
  Maria computes c1= y1m1 mod p1. 
 Maria computes c2= y2m2 mod p1. 
 Maria transmits encrypted message c = (c0 , c1, c2) to John. 
Owing to the message overhead present memory requirement of c is double the  original 
message m. 
 Decryption: John desires to retrieve the message m from c. 
 John computes ac0 = (y1, y2) 
 John recovers message m by computing m = (c1 mod p, c2  mod p) 
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C h a p t e r  6 
Work Done 
 
6.1 SPIRAL AND DE-SPIRAL ALGORITHM 
Consider the message sequence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 
The size of sequence is 27. Square root of 27 when stored in an integer data type will give 5. 
Square of 5 when subtracted from 27 will return 2 i.e.; those which won’t fit into perfect 
square matrix. Left out numbers are transmitted as they are. Our encrypted data (by ECC) 
will undergo a “twist” in its sequence (Fig 6.1) through this to make the data transmission 
more robust (cipher text more complex for an Eavesdropper) 
 
1  6  11  16  21 
2  7  12  17  22 
3  8  13  18  23             26   27 
4  9  14  19  24 
5 10 15  20  25 
Figure 6.1 Spiral Traversal 
 
Encrypted Data 
1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 20, 15, 10, 5, 4, 3, 2, 7, 12, 17, 18, 19, 14, 9, 8, 13, 26, 27 
Which will be decrypted back into original sequence by putting reverse algorithm (DE spiral) 
to above as will be shown in output figures. 
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6.2 OVERALL ALGORITHM OF ELLIPTIC CURVE 
CRYPTOGRAPHY, SPIRAL AND DE-SPIRAL COMBINED 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Overall combined ECC and Spiral algorithm 
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6.3 RESULT 
 
6.3.1 Spiral Encryption 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Spiral Encoding 
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6.3.2 ECC Encryption 
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Figure 6.4 ECC Co-ordinate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: ECC Encryption 
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Figure 6.6: Sequence of user data being Encrypted Decrypted 
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Figure 6.7: Encrypted message sequence c1 component in “Twisted” form 
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Figure 6.8 Encrypted Message Sequence C2 in “Twisted” form 
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6.4 Result Analysis & Discussion 
 
As source message is chunked into two parts m1 and m2, in Encrypted message we get 
Public Key of Alice, C1 and C2 (Fig 7.4). In reality the spiral code was implemented on a 
single pressure sensor sending 16 Byte of Hexadecimal data to a remote server in each 
interval of 30 seconds. The maximum value that can be represented by a Byte is FF(255). 
Hence for appropriate Finite Field Calculation in the field 263 was chosen (any prime greater 
than 255) for modular arithmetic. 
 
In Fig 7.5 the input data is shown. Actually this data is obtained by splitting the data into two 
parts such that the combined data is a valid sensor output. Hence the combination of two 
consecutive values over here is less than 263. 
 
 C1 and C2 for a sequence of data were stored in two separate arrays (Fig 7.6 & Fig 7.7) and 
Spiral algorithm was applied on it individually making received data more complex for the 
intruder. 
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Conclusion & Future Work     
   
By doing this project we came to know about Wireless Sensor Network, their essential day to 
day application, threats and attacks against their security as well as some security protocols 
and algorithms. Among network security protocols we came to know about Dynamic Key 
Management being implemented in LOCK model and how it is superior to SHELL model 
although both use EBS scheme. However wireless data being always prone to attacks / 
Eavesdropping software cryptography has always a crucial role to play. We came to know 
about Public Key Encryption, RSA and elaborately discussed about data security and 
authentication.   However ECC being state of art widely used Encryption Technique and 
more efficient than RSA in terms of memory/ power requirements we implemented that that 
in our project but with the modification of our twisting Spiral Algorithm. 
 
Our future work will include the real world application of this cryptography technique. For 
the sake of understanding we have used small prime number for modular arithmetic but for 
all practical purposes we need to handle really huge prime numbers requiring separate Maths 
Library Functions. We would also like to research in the field data signature and 
authentication. 
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